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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STANDING - PARENTS OF 
BLACK CHILDREN ATTENDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS UNDER-
GOING DESEGREGATION LACK STANDING TO CHALLENGE 
ALLEGEDL Y INEFFECTIVE IRS PROCEDURES DESIGNED TO 
LIMIT TAX-EXEMPT STATUS TO RACIALLY NONDISCRIMI-
NATORY PRIVATE SCHOOLS. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 
(1984). 
Parents of black Tennessee schoolchildren brought a class action 
suit I alleging that Internal Revenue Service (IRS) procedures2 failed to 
fulfill that agency's obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially dis-
criminatory schools. 3 The parents claimed that the IRS procedures 
I. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Wright v. Regan, 
656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 
(1984). 
In 1976, Inez Wright, the mother of four black children attending public school 
in Memphis, Tennessee, and a number of similarly situated parents in other states 
initiated the class action against the Secretary of the Treasury, G. William Miller, 
later replaced by Donald T. Regan. Mr. Wayne Allen, chairman of a private 
school, was later granted leave to intervene. The parents claimed that some racially 
discriminatory private schools were improperly receiving federal tax-exempt status 
because IRS procedures were inadequate to detect false certifications by the schools 
of nondiscriminatory policies. The parents sought a court order requiring nation-
wide implementation by the IRS of new procedures designed to identify these 
schools and to prevent all racially discriminatory schools from receiving tax-exempt 
status. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3321 (1984). The parents alleged that the 
existing IRS procedures violated several laws: 1.R.c. § 501(c)(3) (1982) (governing 
the tax-exempt status of charitable organizations); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982); 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (1982); and, the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the Constitution. [d. at 3322 n.12. The parents did not 
claim injury as dissatisfied taxpayers protesting a tax expenditure. Rather, they 
based their claim on constitutional and statutory injuries and unconstitutional subsi-
dization of private discrimination as a result of government tax policies. [d. at 
3323-24. 
2. The IRS requires that all schools applying for tax-exempt status adopt a "racially 
nondiscriminatory policy as to students." The IRS defines such a policy as meaning 
that a school: 
admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and 
activities generally accorded or made available to the students at that 
school and that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race in 
administration of its educational policies, admission policies, scholarship 
and loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs. 
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1972-2 C.B. 230. 
In response to the lawsuit, the IRS reviewed its procedures and proposed more 
stringent guidelines. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978) (proposed August 22, 1978). The 
IRS proposals raised considerable opposition and debate. In response, the IRS held 
public hearings, Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure Affecting Tax-Exemption of Pri-
vate Schools: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 479 (1979), and proposed a revised set of 
guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451 (1979) (proposed February 12, 1979). IRS action 
was subsequently stayed by congressional amendment to the 1980 Treasury Appro-
priations Act. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, §§ 103,615,93 Stat. 559, 562, 577 (1979) (known as 
the Ashbrook and Dornam amendments). There was no restrictive legislation in 
effect when the Supreme Court decided Allen. 
3. The parents claimed that, despite IRS policy of denying tax-exempt status to ra-
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harmed them in two ways: first, the mere existence of government finan-
cial aid to discriminatory private schools caused the parents to suffer 
denigration; second, federal tax-exempt status, when conferred on ra-
cially discriminatory private schools in their communities, interfered 
with their children's ability to receive an education in desegregated pub-
lic schools. 4 The district court dismissed the suit, reasoning that the par-
ents lacked standing because they failed to assert a concrete injury.s The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed, holding that denigration suffered as a result of governmental 
assistance to racially discriminatory schools is an allegation of injury suf-
ficient to confer standing on parents of black schoolchildren.6 The 
Supreme Court reversed and denied the parents standing.7 The Court 
reasoned that whether it regarded the parents' claim of denigration as 
either a claim to have the government stop violating the law or as a claim 
of stigmatic injury suffered by racial minorities, the injury alleged was 
not judicially cognizable.8 The Court also denied standing premised on 
governmental interference with the children's education and held that 
although this injury was judicially cognizable, it could not support stand-
ing because the injury was not "fairly traceable" to the challenged gov-
cially discriminatory private schools, existing IRS procedures were inadequate to 
detect false certifications of nondiscriminatory policies. The parents sought a de-
claratory judgment that the challenged procedures were unlawful, an injunction re-
quiring that the IRS deny tax-exempt status to a broader class of private schools 
than existing procedures provided for, and an order directing the IRS to adopt new 
procedures consistent with the requested injunction. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 
3315, 3319-23 (1984). 
4. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3319 (1984). 
5. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790, 794 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Wright v. 
Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 
3315 (1984). 
In Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd memo sub nom. Coit V. 
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), black parents and their school-age children, all resi-
dents of Mississippi, secured an order enjoining the IRS from granting tax-exempt 
status to racially discriminatory private schools in Mississippi. Simultaneously with 
the filing of the Wright action, the plaintiffs in Green filed an action in the same 
district court alleging that the IRS was in violation of the court order applicable to 
Mississippi. Green V. Simon, No. 1355-69 (D.D.C. July 23, 1976). Six months after 
denying the Wright plaintiffs standing, the same judge issued an injunction in favor 
of the Green plaintiffs, ordering that the IRS implement guidelines for Mississippi 
substantially similar to those requested by the Wright plaintiffs for nationwide im-
plementation. Green V. Miller, No. 13355-69 (D.D.C. May 5, 1980) (clarified and 
amended June 2, 1982). The anomalous result of the district court's ruling is that 
the IRS now applies two sets of guidelines, one specifically for Mississippi and an-
other for all other states. See Rev. Proc. 75-50, § 8, 1975-2 C.B. 587, 590 (to the 
extent the court's order varies from the guidelines, the order is controlling for Mis-
sissippi schools). For a complete discussion of the procedural history of the Green 
and Wright actions, see Wright V. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 822-26 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
rev'd sub nom. Allen V. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984). 
6. Wright V. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 827, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub 110m. Allen V. 
Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984). 
7. Allen V. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3324 (1984). 
8. Id. at 3326. 
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emmental conduct. 9 
A plaintiff without article III standing cannot invoke the power of 
the federal courts. \0 To have standing, the plaintiff must be the proper 
party to request an adjudication of a particular issue. II At minimum, a 
plaintiff must have a personal stake in the outcome of the suit sufficient 
to assure concrete adverseness. 12 Before 1970, the test for standing was 
whether the plaintiff had suffered injury to a "legally protected inter-
est." \3 In 1970 the Court rejected this test, reasoning that the test im-
properly required consideration of the merits of the plaintiff's claim. 14 In 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, I 5 the Court 
adopted an "injury-in-fact" test for standing. 16 Under this test a wide 
variety of grievances have been recognized as allegations of injury-in-fact 
constitutionally sufficient to support standing; allegations of economic 
10ss,17 interference with social rights,18 or generalized grievances l9 have 
been recognized by the Court as adequate bases for standing. 
In addition to the injury-in-fact requirement for standing, the 
Supreme Court has formulated a separate causation doctrine that must 
be satisfied prior to recognition of article III standing. 20 To satisfy the 
9. /d. 
10. "Those who do not possess Art. III standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts 
of the United States." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sep-
aration of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1982). Article III of the 
Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the adjudication of 
"cases" or "controversies." Standing focuses on whether the party initiating the 
action has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to involve the 
power of the court on his behalf. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§§ 3-17 to 3-24 (1978). 
11. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1978). 
12. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
13. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 
(1939) (legal rights protected were those arising out of contract, those protected 
against tortious invasion, those involving property, or those founded on a statute 
that confers a privilege). 
14. Association of Data Processing Servo Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). 
15. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
16. The Court formulated a two part test; to have standing a party must allege injury-
in-fact, and the injury must be within the "zone of interests" protected by a particu-
lar statute. Id. at 152-53. There has been little subsequent reference to the "zone of 
interests" requirement and its current validity has been questioned. 3 C. WRIGHT, 
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 71 n.52 (4th ed. 1983). 
17. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970) (tenant farmers have standing to chal-
lenge amendment of federal regulation that would cause them economic hardship). 
18. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (loss of "social 
benefits of living in an integrated community" is sufficient allegation of injury). 
19. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (generalized environmental inter-
ests are deserving of legal protection). The Sierra Club was denied standing, how-
ever, because it did not allege that it or any of its members had suffered injury. Id. 
at 735. 
20. The Court recognized causation as a requirement for standing in Linda R.S. v. 
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). The mother of an illegitimate child was denied 
standing to challenge the state's policy of prosecuting only married parents for non-
payment of child support. The Court acknowledged that the mother had been in-
174 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
causation requirement, the plaintiff must allege direct injury to himselP' 
fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and likely to be redressed by 
the requested relief. 22 There is, however, no fixed standard governing 
when these elements of causation are satisfied; hence, application of the 
doctrine has been uneven. 23 
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization (EK-
WRO),24 the Supreme Court used causation analysis to deny indigent 
patients standing to challenge IRS grants of tax-exempt status to private 
hospitals. 25 The patients claimed that their ability to receive needed 
medical care was impaired by IRS policy allowing private hospitals offer-
ing only minimal free health care to retain tax-exempt status.26 The 
Court stated that the patients' claimed injury could not be fairly traced 
to the challenged IRS action nor was it likely that the injury would be 
redressed by use of the Court's remedial powers.27 The Court noted that 
the hospitals could refuse to provide unlimited free medical care for any 
number of reasons unrelated to their tax-exempt status. 28 Further, it was 
speculative that a court order withdrawing tax-exempt status would fa-
cilitate the patients' objective of gaining admission to the hospitals be-
cause the hospitals could elect to forego favorable tax treatment to avoid 
the financial drain of providing uncompensated services.29 The Court 
dismissed the action because the requisite elements of causation were not 
satisfied and, therefore, the patients lacked standing to bring suit.30 
The Supreme Court has often found the causation requirements for 
standing satisfied in suits alleging violation of the right of school children 
jured by the father's nonpayment, but it held there was insufficient causal 
connection between the injury and the alleged discriminatory enforcement of Texas 
law. Further, the Court found it unlikely that prosecution of the father would cause 
him to pay the support. The statute involved merely provided for incarceration of 
the father and, therefore, a court order would not have redressed the mother's in-
jury. Id. at 618. The requirements of direct injury and redressability advanced in 
Linda R.S. were used by the Court to create a separate requirement of causation as 
a precondition for article III standing. See Leedes, Mr. Justice Powell's Standing, II 
U. RICH. L. REV. 269, 287 (1977) ("inability of the Court to give relief ... can 
[become] a problem with constitutional dimensions"). 
21. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
22. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. (EKWRO), 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). 
23. Compare Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 
(1978) (a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress the injury is 
sufficient to confer standing) with EKWRO, 426 U.S. 26,45 (1976) (to satisfy article 
III standing requirements, a plaintiff must show "that, in fact, the asserted injury 
was the consequence of the defendants' action, or that prospective relief will remove 
the harm"); see also Nichol, Causation as a Stallding Requirement: The Unprinci-
pled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185, 186 (1980-81) ("causation decisions, 
on the whole, have been characterized by a harsh inconsistency"). 
24. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
25. !d. at 37. 
26. Id. at 42. 
27. Id. at 41-43. 
28. !d. at 42-43. 
29. Id. at 43-46. 
30.Id. 
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to an integrated education in the public schools.3 ) In Norwood v. Harri-
son 32 the Supreme Court recognized a causal connection between a state 
program that provided textbooks to all students, including those attend-
ing racially discriminatory private schools, and injury to the right of 
black students to an integrated education in the public schools. The 
Court stated that the government may not provide any aid that tends to 
facilitate, reinforce, or support private discrimination.33 Similarly, in 
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 34 the Court recognized a causal connec-
tion between the reservation of public parks for the temporary exclusive 
use of racially discriminatory private schools and injury to a student's 
right to an integrated education in the public school system. The Court 
stated that reservation of public parks for athletic activities significantly 
enhanced the attractiveness of the private schools to white parents seek-
ing an alternative to the integrated public schools and violated the city's 
constitutional obligation to integrate the public schools. 35 Further, in 
Coit v. Green,36 the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the right of 
black parents to challenge the adequacy of IRS procedures used to deny 
tax exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. The Court 
summarily affirmed the decision of the district court, which ordered the 
IRS to implement new and more stringent procedures governing deter-
mination of tax-exempt status of private schools in Mississippi.37 Thus, 
Norwood,38 Gilmore,39 and Green 4D support the premise that black public 
schoolchildren and their parents have standing to challenge governmen-
tal action that aids racially discriminatory private schools. 
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides that organizations op-
erated exclusively for charitable or educational purposes are exempt from 
federal income taxes and contributions to such organizations are deduct i-
31. The Constitution does not compel the states to provide its residents an education. 
See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. I (1972) (education is not within 
the limited category of rights guaranteed by the Constitution). Where, however, a 
state has undertaken to provide a system of public education, it becomes a property 
right which must be available to all on equal terms. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 493 (1954). In Brown the Supreme Court held that states could not segre· 
gate children in the public schools on the basis of race. [d. at 495. The Court 
extended this prohibition to the federal government in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 
497 (1954). 
The parents in Allen alleged the challenged IRS policy significantly impacted 
on the racial composition of the public schools and thus impaired their children's 
right to an integrated education in the public schools. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3321·23 
(1984). 
32. 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
33. [d. at 466. 
34. 417 U.S. 556 (1974). 
35. /d. at 563. 
36. 404 U.S. 997, affg memo Green V. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971). 
37. [d. 
38. 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
39. 417 U.S. 556 (1974). 
40. 404 U.S. 997, affg memo Green V. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971). 
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ble from taxable income.41 The IRS, however, denies tax-exempt status 
to private schools failing to show affirmatively that the school has 
adopted a "racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students," that such 
policy is made known to the general public, and that the school has acted 
in accordance with that policy.42 
In Bob Jones University v. United States 43 the Supreme Court upheld 
the denial by the IRS of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory pri-
vate schools.44 Bob Jones University had claimed the IRS exceeded its 
authority by revoking the school's tax-exempt status because of the 
school's racially discriminatory policies. The Court held that private 
schools that practice racial discrimination are not entitled to tax-exempt 
status under the Code, and that the IRS had not exceeded its authority 
by requiring that private schools adopt a racially nondiscriminatory ad-
missions policy as a precondition to recognition of tax-exempt status 
under the Code.45 
In Allen v. Wright,46 the Supreme Court denied black parents stand-
ing to challenge IRS procedures because of insufficient allegation of in-
jury and failure to satisfy the elements of causation.47 The parents' first 
claim, that they and their children suffered denigration when racially dis-
criminatory private schools received tax-exempt status, failed because it 
was not a judicially cognizable injury.48 The Court stated that an as-
serted right to have the government act within the law is not sufficient 
basis for standing.49 Further, stigmatic injury caused by racial discrimi-
nation accords standing to only those who are personally injured by the 
challenged conduct. 50 Because the parents alleged no previous attempt 
to gain, or future interest in gaining, admission for their children to any 
of the schools alleged to be racially discriminatory, the parents never 
41. The Internal Revenue Code provides that corporations organized for educational 
purposes are exempt from federal income taxation. I.R.c. § 501(a), (c)(3) (1982). 
The schools are also exempt from federal social security taxes, id. at § 312(b)(8)(B) 
(1982), and federal unemployment taxes, id. at § 3306(c)(8) (1982). Contributions 
are deductible from gross income, id. at § 170 (1982), and from federal estate and 
gift tax, id. at §§ 2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(2) (1982). 
42. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
43. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
44. Id. at 596-602. 
45. [d. 
46. \04 S. Ct. 3315 (1984). 
47. Id. at 3326. 
48. Id. at 3326-27. 
49. Id. The Court in part bases its use of causation analysis to decide the issue of stand-
ing on the separation of powers doctrine. See generally Logan, Standing to Sue: A 
Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37 (1984). The Court 
maintains that separation of powers constraints placed on the judiciary by the Con-
stitution preclude the recognition of standing to challenge generally programs im-
plemented by the Executive Branch to fulfill its constitutional mandate to execute 
the laws. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3329-30 (1984). Thus, the doctrine al-
lows recognition of standing only where the plaintiff seeks to enforce a specific legal 
obligation to him, the violation of which works a direct harm. Id. 
50. Id. at 3327. 
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experienced direct stigmatic injury; therefore, the Court denied standing 
premised on denigration suffered. 5 J 
The parents' second claim of injury was that tax-exempt status for 
racially discriminatory private schools impaired their children's ability to 
receive a racially integrated education in the public schools. Although 
the Court noted that this was a judicially cognizable injury, it denied 
standing because the alleged injury was not fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged IRS procedures. 52 The Court stated that the parents had failed to 
show that existing IRS procedures allowed a sufficient number of racially 
discriminatory schools to receive improperly tax-exempt status for with-
drawal of those exemptions to make an appreciable difference in the inte-
gration of the public schools.53 Further, it was speculative that a court 
order mandating implementation of new procedures would cause either 
the private schools or white parents to alter their behavior in a manner 
that would significantly affect the racial composition of the public 
schools. 54 The Court reasoned that the black parents lacked standing to 
bring suit because the parents' allegations of injury to their children's 
ability to receive an integrated education could not be fairly traced to the 
challenged IRS action and the injury was not likely to be redressed by 
the requested relief. 55 
Two Justices dissented from the Court's opinion in Allen.56 Neither 
recognized the plaintiffs' claim of denigration caused by governmental 
action as a constitutionally sufficient allegation of injury.57 Rather, both 
dissenting Justices found that the parents had satisfied the traceability 
and redressability components of the causation doctrine. 58 The dissenting 
Justices maintained that the parents should be granted standing to chal-
lenge IRS procedures alleged to interfere with their children's right to an 
integrated education in the public schools. 59 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 3328. 
53. Id. at 3328-29. 
54. Id. at 3329. 
55. Id. at 3329-30. 
56. Id. at 3333-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 3342-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
57. Justice Brennan concluded that the alleged injury to the children'S right to an inte-
grated public education was sufficient to satisfy article III standing requirements 
and, therefore, it was not necessary to reach the issue of stigmatic injury. Allen v. 
Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3335 n.3 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens 
stated that the alleged injury to the children's right to an integrated education in the 
public schools was an adequate allegation of injury-in-fact and he did not discuss the 
issue of stigmatic injury. /d. at 3342 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
58. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3335-37 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 3342, 3345 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
59. Justice Brennan noted that in the analogous context of housing discrimination, de-
nial of the right to live in an integrated community is sufficient injury to satisfy 
constitutional standing requirements and there was no rational basis for treating 
schoolchildren differently from residents. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3336 (1984) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); see supra note 18 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens argued that 
separation of powers should be considered under a distinct justiciability analysis and 
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Prior to the Court's decision in Allen v. Wright,60 Supreme Court 
precedent as to whether black citizens have standing to challenge govern-
ment action alleged to be in denigration of their race was divided. In 
Norwood v. Harrison,61 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,62 and Coit v. 
Green,63 the standing of black citizens was premised on the government's 
obligation to refrain from giving any aid or support that tends to facili-
tate or reinforce private discrimination.64 These cases support recogni-
tion of the black parents' right to challenge IRS procedures alleged to 
denigrate their position as members of their communities.65 Under EK-
WRO,66 however, stigmatic injury would be judicially cognizable only if 
the parents identified some concrete injury which would be redressed by 
the requested relief in order to independently satisfy the causation re-
quirement of article III standing.67 Thus, standing would be denied un-
less the black parents could show a direct causal relationship between 
their claimed injuries and the challenged IRS grants of tax-exempt status 
to the private schools.68 
In Allen v. Wright,69 the Supreme Court denied standing70 'on the 
basis of EKWRO.71 The Court characterized the parents' allegations of 
injury in broad terms72 even though the parents had limited their claim 
of injury to denigration they and their children had personally suffered as 
a result of IRS grants of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory 
that considerations of tax policy, economics, and pure logic required recognition of 
standing by the Court. Id. at 3345 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
60. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984). 
61. 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
62. 417 U.S. 556 (1974). 
63. 404 U.S. 997, affg memo Green V. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971). 
64. Allen V. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3339 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Norwood 
explicitly stands for the proposition that governmental aid to racially discriminatory 
schools is a direct impediment to school desegregation"); see supra notes 31-40 and 
accompanying text. 
65. See Bob Jones University V. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); McCoy & Devins, 
Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemptions for Discriminatory Pri-
vate Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 441, 447-48 (1984) (standing based on denigra-
tion of race implicitly accepted by the Supreme Court in Norwood V. Harrison). See 
generally Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Ex-
empt Private Schools, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378, 385-86 (1979) (the Supreme Court 
implied in Norwood V. Harrison that parents of children attending public schools 
could challenge any "tangible assistance" given to discriminatory schools by the 
government). 
66. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
67. Allen V. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3328 n.22 (1984); see supra notes 24-30 and ac-
companying text. 
68. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315,3326 n.19 (1984). 
69. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984). 
70. !d. at 3326. 
71. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
72. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3327 (1984) (recognition of the parents' standing on their claim of 
injury would mean that a black person in Hawaii could challenge the tax-exempt 
status of a discriminatory school in Maine). 
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schools in their communities.73 Further, unlike the plaintiffs in EK-
WRO,74 the parents did not seek admission of their children to a private 
institution. Rather, they wanted the IRS to implement effective proce-
dures to identify racially discriminatory schools in their communities 
and deny them tax-exempt status. Contrary to the majority's conten-
tion,75 the relief sought, unlike that in EKWRO,76 was not dependent on 
the actions of outside parties. The tax benefits received by the racially 
discriminatory schools would cease upon withdrawal of tax-exempt sta-
tus. Thus, any interference with the children's right to an integrated ed-
ucation in the public schools caused by federal tax policy would be 
eliminated by a court order withdrawing tax-exempt status for the 
schools.77 By characterizing the nexus between the government's con-
duct and desegregation of the public schools as "attenuated, "7S the Court 
denied standing on causation grounds without first determining whether 
the black parents have a substantive right to demand that their govern-
ment refrain from giving aid to racially discriminatory private schools in 
their communities.79 
The Supreme Court has been criticized for using the causation doc-
trine as a thin disguise for its opinion on the merits of the underlying 
claim.so The Supreme Court's denial of standing in Allen v. Wright Sl is 
evidence that the Court does not want to involve itself in controversies 
concerning tax-exempt status for segregated private schools beyond its 
decision in Bob Jones University v. United States S2 that those private 
73. [d. at 3335 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the parents limit their claim of stigmatic 
injury to that caused by illegal grants of tax-exempt status by the IRS to racially 
discriminatory schools located in their communities where the public schools are 
currently desegregating). 
74. 426 U.S. 26 (1976); see supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. 
75. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3328-29 (1984). 
76. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
77. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3342-45 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the parents' injury will be 
redressed if the discriminatory schools' operations are inhibited through denial of 
tax-exempt status); Note, supra note 65, at 386 n.4O (implementation of effective 
procedures wi1l remedy unconstitutional governmental support of private 
discrimination). 
78. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3328 (1984). 
79. !d. at 3333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the Court denies the parents' standing "with-
out acknowledging the precise nature of the injuries they have alleged"); see also 
Logan, supra note 49, at 53 ("[I]t is illogical to evaluate any claim made by a party 
without reference to the nature of the right asserted, and by so doing, the Court 
makes a constitutional decision regarding standing in an analytic vacuum."). 
80. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3341 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also 
Chayes, Forward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
14-22 (1982) (the Court "stack[s] the deck" by its characterization of the injury-in-
fact that the plaintiff asserts); Nichol, supra note 23, at 186 ("The tests employed are 
too easily manipulated to coincide with the desire, or lack thereof, to reach the 
merits of particular cases. "); Tushnet, The New Law Standing: A Plea for Abandon-
ment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663 (1977) ("Decisions on questions of standing 
are concealed decisions on the merits of the underlying constitutional claim."). 
8\. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984). 
82. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Justice Powell stated that it was for Congress to make the 
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schools discriminating on the basis of race are ineligible for tax-exempt 
status under the Code. In Bob Jones University 83 the Court stressed that 
the IRS had primary responsibility for construing the Code and that 
Congress had vested the IRS with broad authority to formulate proce-
dures for its implementation.84 By denying the black parents standing to 
challenge IRS procedures designed to limit tax-exempt status to nondis-
criminatory private schools, the Court leaves to Congress and the Execu-
tive the task of articulating policy on tax-exemptions for discriminatory 
organizations. 
Susan D. Cobun 
legislative policy choices as to tax-exemptions for discriminatory organizations and 
that public policy should not be determined by judges. [d. at 611-12 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See also McCoy & Devins, 
supra note 65, at 443-44. 
83. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
84. [d. at 596. 
